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The aim of this thesis is to discuss certain legally philosophical aspects of fact-
findings in civil procedure. In a simplified way, this work is focused on exploring 
the possibility of determining the value of truthfulness of  quaestio facti when 
applying law.
The  six  chapters  of  the  work  include  three  basic  themes.  The  first  one 
examines the reflection of the philosophical concepts of truth in the process of 
determining  the  facts  of  a  case,  the  second  one  clarifies  the  nature  of  the 
ideological  aims  of  fact-findings  in  the  form  of  principles  of  formal  and 
substantive legal truth and the third topic deals with the nature of a judge´s 
beliefs in the truthfulness of factual claims and the role of probability in the 
judge´s belief
At first I briefly present the phenomenon of truth in a wider philosophical 
context so that I can then proceed to outline the selected theories of truth. After 
explaining the basic essence of the legal procedural principles which have the 
greatest impact on the process of finding the facts, I pass, in another part of the 
thesis,  to the very analysis of these principles through the prism of selected 
theories of truth. The reflection of the philosophical concepts of truthfulness on 
the principles of  formal and substantive legal  truth in the fourth chapter is 
followed by the fifth chapter outlining the influence of the cohesive theory of 
truth  on  the  institutes  of  civil  proceedings,  which  are  considered  as 
manifestations of the principle of formal legal truth.
Since the judge's subjective beliefs are crucial to establishing the truth of 
the factual affirmations, I deal with the nature of the judge´s conviction in the 
last, sixth chapter. Within the judge´s beliefs, the question of the probability 
role in assessing the veracity of the parties' factual acts and at the same time 
the degree of necessary conviction of the judge in the standard of proof are 
highlighted. The question of the probability and nature of the judge´s internal 
conviction is important for the whole issue of fact-findings as such.
In conclusion, I try to synthesize the existing knowledge of the required level 
of standard of proof. On the basis of the analysis of the two main concepts of 
standard of proof, I come to the conclusion of merging the positive aspects of 
the two proposed theories  in  order  to  determine the optimal,  yet  achievable 
degree of the judge´s conviction necessary for reaching a proof successfully.
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